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DESPITE INITIAL FEARS TO THE CONTRARY, IT
APPEARS THAT SARBANES-OXLEY GAVE
PRIVATE LITIGANTS A “DULL SWORD” WHEN IT
COMES TO PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Glen M. Vogel, Esq. 1
Dr. Nathan S. Slavin 2
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, accountants have managed to ride out
the storm of massive corporate accounting scandals, the demise of one
of the premier accounting firms in the country, a tarnished perception of
the profession, and the resulting impact of the landmark passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”). 3 Even though the worst seems to be behind
us, the question still remains – are there still more ticking financial timebombs sitting out there waiting to go off? If so, are investors better
protected from economic ruin by Sarbanes-Oxley and related regulation?
Despite early hopes and predictions that this legislation would stop
future scandals and restore investor confidence, the jury is still out on
whether this landmark legislation truly affords investors the protections
it was intended to provide.
1. Glen M. Vogel, Esq. is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies in the Hofstra
University Zarb School of Business. He would like to acknowledge and thank the Zarb
School of Business for its generous research grant that contributed to the genesis of this
Article. He also extends gratitude to Hofstra Law School student Chris Cella and Zarb
School of Business student Yusef Khan for their tremendously valuable research
contributions.
2. Nathan S. Slavin, Ph.D., CPA, is a Professor and Chairman of the Department
of Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in the Frank G. Zarb School of Business at
Hofstra University.
3. Bill Carlino, After Major Repairs, Profession Awaits Detail Work,
ACCOUNTING TODAY, Sept. 20, 2004, at 42.
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Just over seven years ago in December of 2001, Enron – the
nation’s seventh largest company based on reported revenues – filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, touching off an eruption of accounting scandals
that rocked the financial world. 4 At the time, Enron’s collapse was the
largest corporate bankruptcy in American history, bringing down a
company with approximately $33 billion in assets. 5 Over a four-year
period, Enron’s executives engaged in a fraudulent accounting scheme
that included overstating profits and understating debts to drive up the
stock price. As the scheme unraveled, investors lost tens of billions of
dollars as the stock price plummeted from a high of near $90 a share to
less than $1 a share. 6 All of this occurred despite the auditing oversight
by one of the largest and most reputable accounting firms at the time –
Arthur Andersen.
Both Congress and the public were outraged that a fraud of such
magnitude could be committed. At the urging of the President, Congress
initiated hearings to examine the Enron collapse and to develop a plan to
prevent similar fraudulent financial schemes from occurring in the future. Nevertheless, over the next half-dozen years, several other major
American corporations such as Worldcom (2002), Adelphia Communications (2002), HealthSouth (2002), Qwest (2002), NYSE (2003),
Parmalat (2003), Marsh and McLennan (2004), AIG (2005), Krispy
Kreme (2005), and Fannie Mae (2006) followed the way of Enron and
suffered economic collapse as a result of colossal accounting irregularities, insider trading, or outright theft. 7
In the midst of these very visible corporate implosions, accountants,
attorneys, and other professionals and organizations who advised public
companies were concerned over their expanding exposure as securities
fraud plaintiffs and their respective counsel continually crafted new
ways to claim that the former acted as enablers, or worse yet, contributors to the frauds committed by the public companies. 8 The theory prof4. Jaclyn Taylor, Fluke or Failure? Assessing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act After
United States v. Scrushy, 74 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 411, 415 (2005).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward:
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1, 8
(2007); see also John Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:
The Case for a Personal Culpability Requirement, 59 BUS. LAW. 1005 (2004).
8. See Peter Geier, Creative Litigation Ensnares Outside Counsel in Shareholder
Suits, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticle
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fered is that the “fraud[s] could not have taken place without lawyers’
and accountants’ advice to their clients . . . .” 9 As a result, Wall Street,
accounting firms, and outside counsel have not escaped unscathed.
Arthur Andersen collapsed as a result of its role in auditing Enron and
subsequently shredding Enron’s documents while it was the subject of a
federal investigation. 10 Similarly, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup,
and many other brokerage firms have been investigated for a myriad of
alleged unethical activities. Finally, law firms, including Enron’s legal
counsel, Vinson & Elkins, which found itself as a defendant in the Enron
multidistrict litigation, 11 and Buchanan Ingersoll and Mayer Brown,
have been named as defendants in investor suits.12
While Enron crumbled and investigators uncovered Arthur
Andersen’s role, the American public screamed for the government to
intervene and prevent such economic disasters from happening again.
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 13 One
of the major goals of SOX was to create an environment of greater corporate integrity and investor confidence by holding company officers
personally accountable for financial misdeeds. For example, Sections
302 and 906 of SOX, the so-called “certification provisions” wherein
high-level executives certify to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) that the company’s regulatory filings are accurate,
were drafted with the idea of “creat[ing] a link between the person and
the document.” 14 In fact, the impetus behind the inclusion of provisions
that require CFOs and CEOs to certify financial statements to be filed
with the SEC was that Congress intended these to be critical pieces of
the statutory puzzle to preventing corporate corruption and fraud. 15
These provisions subjected corporate officers to personal civil and criminal liability unlike ever before. In fact, early predictions were that these

IHC.jsp?id=1138023312254 (discussing the rise in litigation against law firms and
attorneys in their roles as advisors to companies being sued for securities violations).
9. See id.
10. Timeline of Enron’s Collapse, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2004, http://www.washing
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25624-2002Jan10.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
11. Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 7, at *8 (2007); Geier, supra note 8.
12. See Geier, supra note 8.
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
14. Jonathan D. Glater, New Rules Make it Easier to Charge Executives, But Not to
Send Them to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at C5.
15. Id.
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“veil piercing” provisions were going to be an effective tool for preventing future scandals and for restoring investor confidence. 16
Six years later, some experts still agree. “It’s a terrific piece of
legislation . . . it’s worked very well,” said Chuck Bowsher, former U.S.
Controller General. 17 “We’re in much better shape today than we were
prior to Sarbanes-Oxley . . . [t]he markets were in turmoil, corporations
were in disrepute. There was a real fear that the lack of trust in the markets could create long-term problems.” 18 But across the corporate landscape, not everyone agrees with these rosy characterizations. It appears
that SOX, particularly Section 302, has not made prosecuting corporate
officers any easier than it was under traditional veil piercing methods.
As noted by one observer, “[p]erhaps forcing top executives to certify
regulatory filings is not quite the fix lawmakers might have expected.”19
Moreover, some business groups have complained that post-Enron regulation has made American markets less competitive and has driven companies issuing stock to overseas exchanges. 20 All this has left many in
the financial community pondering the question: What impact did SOX
have on the financial marketplace?
Part I of this Article provides a look at the pleading requirements
and realistic opportunity, or lack thereof, of piercing the corporate veil
under traditional pre-SOX litigation rules. Part II examines the impact,
if any, that SOX has had on litigants’ opportunities to include corporate
officers as defendants in securities litigation cases. Part III introduces
some recent cases where courts, including the Supreme Court, have interpreted the veil piercing provisions in SOX and related regulation.
Part IV describes the more recent trend to weaken or loosen the regulation based on the perceived or actual impact SOX has had on the securities industry, while Part V briefly addresses some alternate approaches
to regulating the securities industry that have been adopted in other
countries. Finally, the Article concludes with some suggestions con-

16. Greg Farrell, Sarbanes-Oxley Has Been a Pretty Clean Sweep, USA TODAY,
July 30, 2007, at 6B.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting former SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid).
19. Glater, supra note 14.
20. Stephen Labaton, Is the S.E.C. Changing Course?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007,
at C1 (discussing recent comments by Christopher Cox, the SEC Chairman, wherein he
argued that the tough new regulations were good for competition and were not the
driving force behind the migration of businesses to European exchanges).
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cerning the direction regulators and lawmakers should take when
looking at the U.S. securities industry.
I. A LOOK AT THE TRADITIONAL PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OR HURDLES
FACED BY LITIGANTS ATTEMPTING TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL
Historically, limited liability in the corporate sense meant that
shareholders were not liable for debts owed to the corporation’s creditors. The common response in these instances was for the creditor to try
to bring suit against one or more of the corporation’s shareholders and
argue that liability should be extended beyond the confines of the corporate structure directly to the shareholders. 21 This is commonly referred
to as “piercing the corporate veil.” 22 Generally, a court considers
several critical factors when deciding whether or not to pierce the
corporate shield and impose liability on a shareholder. These include,
but are not limited to: defendant’s wrongful dealings with the plaintiff,
defendant’s abusive dealings with corporate assets, and inadequate
capitalization. 23 Successfully piercing the corporate veil is often
referred to as a “Herculean task”; courts are not quick to ignore the
corporate formalities and extend liability directly to shareholders,
recognizing that “veil piercing is an extraordinary procedure that should
not be used lightly.” 24
A. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and The SEC Rules
Actions seeking to pierce the corporate veil with allegations of securities fraud are typically brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) 25 and SEC Rule 10b5 26 . Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act forbids:

21. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of
Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV.
853, 853 (1997).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 854.
24. Schattner v. Girard, Inc., 668 F.2d 1366, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (2008).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
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the use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
27
protection of investors.

SEC Rule 10b-5 implements Section 10(b) by declaring the
following to be unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
. . . not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 28
Prior to the passage of SOX in 2002, corporate officers could only
be held personally liable for alleged violations of Section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5 if a plaintiff could demonstrate that the officer himself committed
a breach of fiduciary duty sufficient to warrant piercing the corporate
veil. 29 When pleading a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff has to allege fraud “with
particularity” in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 30 That is, a plaintiff is required to plead that there was: (1) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact; (2) made with scienter; (3) in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) relied on by plaintiff; that (5) proximately caused (6) plaintiff’s economic loss. 31 The plaintiff’s claims are
then subject to review under the heightened standard for fraud claims
under the Federal Rules and it is widely accepted that generalized or
conclusory allegations of fraudulent conduct will not satisfy Rule 9(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff
27.
28.
29.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
See Jeannie Nelson, New Corporate Responsibility Law Increases Liabilities
for Directors, Officers, and Attorneys, But Does it Increase Protections for Investors?,
34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2003).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
32. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the circum-
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must “specify the alleged fraudulent statements, the speaker, when and
where the statements were made, and why they are fraudulent.” 33 Thus,
trying to establish fraudulent intent on the part of a corporate officer at
the pleading stage and before any discovery is nearly impossible.
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
In 1995, Congress further heightened the pleading standard for
securities fraud claims by passing the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (“PSLRA”). 34 Under the PSLRA, a plaintiff is required to
“state with particularity, facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind” necessary to prove
fraud. 35 “State of mind”, or scienter, is a “mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate or defraud.” 36 That is, a plaintiff must plead a
“strong inference that the defendant[s] acted at least recklessly” in making false statements, or with knowledge of their falsity. 37 Recklessness
under the PSLRA is “a mental state apart from negligence and akin to
conscious disregard.” 38 Typically, litigants would surmise that proof that
the corporation’s financial statements were false would be enough to
establish intent. Courts, however, have routinely held that subsequent
revelations that financial statements were false could not, standing
alone, create this strong inference of scienter. 39
One could certainly make the claim that the aforementioned hodgepodge of regulation can be confusing. Not only have these requirements
made pleading securities fraud more difficult for plaintiffs, but in
passing the PSLRA, Congress also muddied the waters by not defining
the terms “scienter” or “strong inference”. It appears that these terms
were deliberately left undefined; Congress stated it did not intend to

stances constituting the fraud must be pled with particularity.
33. Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 287 (5th Cir. 2006).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A).
35. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
36. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976)).
37. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001).
38. In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550.
39. In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 436 F. Supp. 2d 873, 896 (N.D.
Ohio 2006) (holding that the plaintiffs could not impute such knowledge sufficient to
establish scienter to the individual defendants merely because they certified the financial statements).
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codify how these standards should be met. 40 After the PSLRA was
passed in the House of Representatives, the Senate attempted to amend it
to include a provision that recognized motive and opportunity as a basis
for liability so that litigants would better understand what they needed to
do to meet the pleading requirements for securities fraud. 41 Ultimately
this amendment was not adopted and President Clinton vetoed the bill,
claiming it erected a “higher barrier for litigants” to bringing suit than
what was currently in existence and would result in “even the most
aggrieved investors with the most painful losses” having their cases dismissed at the pleading stage. 42 Despite these concerns, Congress overrode the veto and the PSLRA was enacted without the amendment proposed by the Senate.
There has been some non-legislative guidance to interpreting the
terms “strong inference” and “scienter.” Prior to the passage of the
PSLRA, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that pleading a “strong inference” of scienter could be established by
showing that: (1) the defendant acted recklessly; (2) the defendant had
the motive and opportunity to commit fraud; 43 or (3) the defendant, a
corporate insider, “misrepresented to the public material facts about the
corporation’s performance or prospects in order to keep the stock price
artificially high.” 44 While this interpretation aided litigants in the Second
Circuit, however, it was not the interpretation used by all courts. In fact,
the circuit courts have split on these definitions, with the Ninth Circuit
raising the scienter element to require strong evidence of deliberately
reckless or conscious misconduct. 45 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, in
contrast, have taken the middle road between the Second and Ninth
Circuits, holding that a showing of motive and opportunity alone are not
sufficient to meet the scienter requirement. 46

40.
41.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-369 (1995).
Helwig, 251 F.3d at 549 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Spector)).
42. 141 Cong. Rec. S19035 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (veto message of President
Clinton).
43. Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995).
44. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307-8 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1012 (2000).
45. In re Silicon Graphics Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
46. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999); Garfield
v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the plain
meaning of language contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not indicate any intent
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II. HAVE THE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR FRAUD BEEN IMPACTED BY
THE PASSAGE OF SARBANES-OXLEY?
Post Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC and investors were expected to have
a much greater ability to hold a corporation’s officers accountable for
financial and accounting misdeeds. Under Section 302 of SarbanesOxley, CEOs and CFOs are required to personally certify every annual
or quarterly report that the company files with the SEC under Sections
13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act 47 . This certification process is meant
to provide evidence that the officer reviewed the report and that to the
best of that officer’s knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue
statements or omissions of material fact, and that the information in the
report fairly represents in all material respects the financial condition of
the corporation. The rule requires that the principal financial officer
must certify to his or her knowledge that:
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;
(2) the report does not contain any untrue statement of material
fact;
(3) that the financial information fairly presents in all material
respects the financial condition of the issuer;
(4) that the signing officer is responsible for:
(a) establishing and maintaining internal controls of the
company;
(b) that those controls have been designed to ensure that
material information relating to the company is
known to the officers and others; and
(c) that they have evaluated effectiveness of those
controls; and
(5) that the signing officers have disclosed to the auditors and
audit committee:
(a) any significant deficiencies in the design or operation
of the internal controls;

to change the pleading requirements for pleading scienter set forth in the PSLRA and
that section 302 certifications are only probative of scienter if the person signing them
was severely reckless).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2008).
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(b) any fraud whether or not material that involved management or other employees who have a significant
role in the issuer’s internal controls; and
(c) any significant changes in the internal controls. 48
Violations of Section 302 may lead to civil liability for failing to
meet SOX reporting requirements. 49 Additionally, violations finding
material misstatements or omissions concerning the company’s financial
status that subsequently mislead investors may give birth to a cause of
action brought by either the SEC or private investors 50 .
Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the reporting corporate
manager certify in a written statement that each report submitted to the
SEC contains information that is a fair representation of the corporation’s financial status. A knowing violation of this certification provision can result in 10 years in imprisonment and a $1 million fine. 51 A
willful violation would be punishable by up to 20 years imprisonment
and a $5 million fine. 52
Thus, in essence Sections 302 and 906 were intended to be a codification of the “piercing the corporate veil” doctrine by requiring a corporate officer to expose himself to civil and criminal liability by certifying that he was directly responsible for the content of the SEC filings.
These provisions were intended to make it easier for litigants and prosecutors to get to the individual officers responsible for the fraud. In fact,
as noted by one decision, the signing of the Sarbanes-Oxley certifications gives rise to an inference of scienter because the certifications
evince the officer’s state of mind and establish that the corporate officer
knew or should have known about the improper financial reporting.53
Securities experts have acknowledged that the certification provisions
were designed to prevent top executives from using a “head in the sand”
defense to actions alleging securities fraud committed on their watch. 54
48. Id.; see also Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley: Determining How to
Comply with the New Federal Disclosure Law for Corporations Won’t Be Easy, 89
A.B.A.J. 44 (Feb. 2003).
49. See Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 48.
50. Id.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1) (2002).
52. Id.
53. See In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp., Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262,
*50 (D. Or. 2006).
54. See Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 48.
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Indeed, a statement from the SEC warned corporate officers that submitting a signed false certification under SOX could expose them to both
Commission and private actions for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. 55
Along with the above, Section 101 of SOX required the formation
of the Public Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 56 The PCAOB
was charged with overseeing the audits of public companies in an effort
to provide additional assurances that the interests of investors were
served by the generation of informative, fair, and independent audit
reports. 57 The PCAOB is a non-profit private-sector corporation comprised of a five-member board appointed by the SEC after consultation
with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System and the Secretary of the Treasury. Only two of the five Board
members must be, or must have been, certified public accountants and
all members of the Board serve on a full-time basis. 58 The PCAOB has
the power to: (1) establish or adopt ethics regulations and standards relating to the preparation of audit reports, (2) perform inspections of public accounting firms, (3) conduct investigations, hold disciplinary hearings, and impose sanctions, and (4) enforce compliance with the others
provisions of SOX. 59
One could easily believe that, in light of the above, corporate
executives would be less likely to get away with certifying false or
fraudulent financial information to the SEC and/or public. Nevertheless,
the question remains – is submitting a false certification under Section
10(b) of SOX and SEC Rule 10b-5 enough to prove scienter and to
enable a litigant to pierce the corporate veil? The question appears to be
a difficult one to answer with any degree of certainty. The federal circuit courts are split into three different camps when it comes to determining what exactly is required to satisfy the PSLRA’s pleading requirements for scienter. The split is as follows: one camp consists solely of
the Ninth Circuit; another is comprised of the Second and Third

55. Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports,
Securities Act Release No. 8124, at 34 (Aug. 29, 2002).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2002).
57. Sabyasachi Ghoshray, Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Multiple Listed
Corporations: Conflicts in Comparative Corporate Laws and Possible Remedies, 10
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 447, 450 (Spring 2004).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(1)-(3).
59. Id.
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Circuits; and the last and largest camp encompasses the First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. 60
The Ninth Circuit has set forth the strictest interpretation of the
pleading standard in the case of In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities
Litigation. 61 The court held that, at a minimum, a plaintiff must plead
“particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or
conscious recklessness.” 62 The Ninth Circuit’s holding has been described as creating a “super-recklessness” standard, which has been criticized as being too restrictive by other circuit courts. 63
Conversely, the Second and Third Circuits have employed what can
be characterized as the most pro-plaintiff standard in the country. 64 The
Second and Third Circuits agree that “plaintiffs must allege facts showing (a) both motive and opportunity, or (b) strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.” 65
Sitting somewhere in the middle between the two extremes are the
eight remaining circuits. While there is not a pure consistency among
these eight circuits, it is fair to say they agree that, as a general rule,
pleading motive and opportunity alone is not sufficient to demonstrate
60. Mark Gideon, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the
PSLRA, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1097, 1159 (2007) (noting that the D.C. Circuit itself has not
yet weighed in on the subject but that there have been some District Court opinions
from the D.C. Circuit).
61. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Gompper v.
VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002); DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software,
Inc., 288 F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 2002).
62. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979 (emphasis added).
63. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 n.21 (11th Cir. 1999)
(stating that “[t]o the extent that the effort in Silicon Graphics is an attempt to import
into the law a new and uncertain super-recklessness, we believe that the attempt is
inconsistent with the plain statutory language”) (citation omitted).
64. Ryan G. Miest, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82
MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1133 (1998) (positing that eliminating the use of “motive and
opportunity test” employed by the Second Circuit does not hamper the private enforcement function of 10b-5 actions, rather, the increased difficulty of pleading scienter
without utilizing the motive and opportunity test may result in fewer claims filed and
those plaintiffs who are dissuaded by a stronger standard are precisely the litigants the
PSLRA was enacted to deter).
65. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2004); Kemp v. Universal Am.
Fin. Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2162, at 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Advanta Corp.
Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d
137, 148 (3d Cir. 2004).
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scienter, and that a plaintiff must also provide facts sufficient to support
a strong inference of recklessness. 66
The split among the circuits is only the “tip of the iceberg” when it
comes to the problem of ascertaining what precisely a plaintiff must do
to establish scienter. The federal district courts are even more erratic
than the circuit courts when it comes to addressing the PSLRA’s “strong
inference” of scienter. As noted in a 2002 study of 167 district rulings
regarding the issue, researchers found “aggregate patterns of behavior
that are, to a remarkable degree, statistically indistinguishable from a
‘coin-toss’ model of judicial behavior.” 67 The authors of the study posit
that:
judges who are unconstrained by appellate precedent frequently
adopt minimalist strategies that avoid the need to interpret the
statute. They rule either that a complaint is sufficiently strong that it
satisfies the most stringent conceivable articulation of the pleading
standard, or that it is so deficient that it fails the most forgiving
articulation, without explaining how the ‘strong inference’ standard
68
is to be interpreted or applied.

In August of 2007, for example, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, held that the signing of

66. In re Cabletron Systems, Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 39 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
motive and opportunity alone are not sufficient to plead scienter without a combination
of facts and circumstances indicating fraudulent intent); see also Ottmann v. Hanger
Orthopedic Group, 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc.,
292 F.3d 424, 438 (5th Cir. 2002); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir.
2001); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006);
In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 747-48 (8th Cir. 2002); City of
Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant, 187 F.3d
at 1285.
67. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statues with Multiple Personality
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 627, 678 (2002).
District court judges who interpret the “strong inference” provision generate aggregate
patterns of behavior that are, to a remarkable degree, statistically indistinguishable
from a “coin-toss” model of judicial behavior. In this coin-toss model, the judge first
flips a coin to determine whether the Second Circuit standard prevails or whether
Congress intended to adopt a more stringent standard. If a more stringent standard
applies then the judge tosses the coin again to decide between the Intermediate
standard and the Ninth Circuit standard.

Id.
68.

Id.
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SOX certification reports by the CEO and board chairman, which contained financial mistakes that ultimately had a “large impact” on the
value of the corporation’s shares, was insufficient to plead scienter without a showing that the reports were “intentionally misleading.” 69 The
court arrived at this holding despite the facts that: (i) over a period of
approximately 18 months, the corporation’s income had been overstated
by as much as 70%, (ii) the corporation actually lost $1.27 billion
instead of earning approximately $920 million as previously reported,
and (iii) the corporation filed for bankruptcy while the chairman announced his retirement and the CEO received a generous bonus to stay
on and guide the corporation through bankruptcy. 70
In March 2007, the Northern District Court of California went a
step further and held that a SOX certification containing false declarations that financial statements comply with generally accepted accounting principles is not independently actionable under Section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5 but may be used merely as an “inference of scienter.” 71 In
fact, the court in that case noted that there was “nothing in either the
1934 Securities Exchange Act or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and implementing regulations that authorizes plaintiffs to base a claim for securities fraud on an alleged misstatement in a Sarbanes-Oxley certification.” 72
In an even more troubling case, the District Court for the District of
Colorado not only avoided answering the scienter question, but also
declared that Sections 302 and 906 of SOX do not even grant parties a
private right of action against corporate officers. 73 In Srebnik v. Dean, a
group of shareholders brought an action pursuant to Sections 302 and
906 of SOX against several officers of Miller Diversified Corp., a cattle
feedlot public company in Colorado, and Anderson & Whitney, the
corporation’s auditors and preparers of the proxy statement relating to an
unlawful and fraudulent acquisition of business assets. The defendants
were accused of submitting false SOX certifications to the SEC and of
“loot[ing] assets through concealed off-the-books payments, sham loans
and other bogus transactions including the fraudulent acquisition of a

69.
70.
71.

Frank v. Dana Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
Id. at 926.
See In re Silicon Storage Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21953,
at *52 (N.D. Calif. 2007).
72. Id. at *51.
73. Srebnik v. Dean, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73836, at *19 (Colo. 2006).
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business for a promissory note issued by an insolvent company.” 74
Surprisingly, the court dismissed the shareholders’ complaint, stating
that there was no judicial authority addressing the availability of a
private right of action under Sections 302 and 906 of SOX 75 and that the
text of these sections “do not contain any ‘rights creating’ language or
other indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action
in favor of a class of shareholders for violations of these provisions.” 76
Conversely, one Louisiana District Court in December 2006 pointed out that there was only one case in which a District Court (in Oregon)
found that a certification executed by a corporate officer pursuant to
Section 302 of SOX supports an inference of scienter against the certifying defendant. 77 In In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp., that court elaborated on its analysis of whether certification alone supports scienter by
noting that some commentators have argued that:
when a corporate officer certifies a company’s financial reports, the
company’s later revelation that the reports contained material false
statements can support an inference that the officer either knew or
was reckless about the false statements, by virtue of the company’s
disclosure controls, or that he knew or was reckless in not knowing
78
that the company’s disclosure controls were inadequate.

In the end, however, the Louisiana court held that SOX certifications, alone, would not support a strong enough inference of
scienter. 79
What did this jumble of inconsistent precedents mean for litigants?
At the narrowest level, these cases suggested that the questions presented by the “strong inference” debate were ripe for Supreme Court review
in order to resolve the split among the circuits and hopefully eliminate
the divergence in the district courts. A Supreme Court decision, it was
hoped, could establish a consistent nationwide interpretation of the
“strong inference” standard.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *18.
In re OCA, Inc. Sec. and Derivative Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90854, at
*72 (D. La. 2006) (citing In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 262 (D. Or. 2006)).
78. Id. at *74.
79. Id. at *75.
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III. THE U. S. SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN WITH ITS DECISION
IN TELLABS, INC. V. MAKOR ISSUES AND RIGHTS
Despite the split in the Circuits, it is clear that some form of fraudulent intent is required. In order to clarify this issue for all litigants,
regardless of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declared that a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud is an essential element of a Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim. 80 In essence, a plaintiffshareholder must set forth facts in support of his allegations of fraud, as
well as provide support for allegations of the required state of mind –
that is, facts creating a strong inference of scienter. 81 On June 21, 2007,
the Supreme Court further addressed how to treat an examination of the
pleading requirements in a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action and
specifically how to define a “strong inference” of scienter. 82 In Tellabs,
Inc., the Court held that when determining the existence of a strong
inference of scienter, courts must consider the complaint in its entirety,
as well as documents incorporated into the complaint by reference (such
as SOX certifications) and should conclude that an inference of scienter
has as much plausibility as inferences to the contrary.83 That is, when
the allegations of fraud are accepted as true and taken collectively, a
reasonable person must deem the inference of scienter at least as strong
as any opposing inference. 84 Thus, the inference of scienter must be
cogent and compelling in light of other explanations.
Tellabs is a manufacturer of specialized equipment for fiber optic
networks. 85 The shareholders of Tellabs alleged that Richard Notebaert,
the CEO and president, engaged in a scheme to deceive investors about
the true value of Tellabs stock. 86 Notebaert was accused of: (1) falsely
asserting in January of 2001 that the demand for the company’s flagship
networking device was continuing to grow, (2) stating that the company’s financial results were stronger than they actually were, and (3)
grossly overstating revenue projections. 87 In a December 2000 press
release, Notebaert had declared that Tellabs had “record sales and
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 565 (6th Cir. 2001).
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007).
Id. at 2509-10.
Id. at 2511.
Id. at 2505.
Id.
Id.
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earnings in the fourth quarter of 2000,” and announced that “customers
are buying more and more Tellabs equipment.” 88 Notebaert later informed financial analysts that Tellabs had “set the stage for sustained
growth with the successful launches of several products,” and in January
of 2001 he further elaborated that demand for their latest product, the
TITAN 6500, was exceeding expectations and that they felt “very, very
good about the robust growth we’re experiencing.” 89
Later, in February of 2001, a letter signed by Notebaert was sent to
stockholders wherein it was stated that Tellabs’s growth was robust, its
markets held significant potential for sustained growth, its core business
was performing well, and that sales of the TITAN 6500 were up 56% in
2000. 90 The first sign of trouble appeared in March of 2001 when
Tellabs unexpectedly reduced its first quarter sales projections. Simultaneously, however, Notebaert reiterated the company’s positive forecasts by declaring that demand for its core products remained strong. 91
This pattern of reducing sales projections while announcing strong
interest in products continued for several months. Finally, on June 19,
2001, Tellabs announced that projected sales for the second quarter
would be almost $300 million less than originally projected. 92 The next
day, Tellabs’ stock price plummeted from $38 a share to $15.87 a
share. 93 This drop was on top of the initial drop in stock price from $67
that occurred around March of 2001. 94 In a five-month span, therefore,
the stock price went from $67 to $15.87 a share. In December of 2002,
shareholders filed suit against Tellabs and ten executives in the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 95 The complaint alleged that
Tellabs stock was artificially inflated causing market analysts to continue to recommend that investors buy that stock. 96 The complaint was
dismissed on several grounds, including a finding that “the complaint
failed to adequately allege that the defendants’ conduct met the scienter

88.
2006).
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2505 (2007).
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standard for securities fraud, which requires that they intended ‘to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’” 97
“In July of 2003, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint,
bolstering their allegations with references to 27 confidential sources,
shortening the list of defendants by four, eliminating a few of their
weaker claims, and adding more specific scienter allegations against
each of the remaining defendants.” 98 After the District Court again dismissed the complaint, the shareholders appealed to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals which reversed in part, finding that the shareholders
“had pleaded the misleading character of Notebaert’s statements with
sufficient particularity.” 99 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, however, the
Seventh Circuit also determined that they had failed to allege that
Notebaert acted with scienter. 100 The shareholders then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg established a three-part
test for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a securities fraud
claim. First, courts must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true.” 101 Second, courts should not scrutinize any individual allegation in isolation, but rather should “consider the complaint in its entirety,
as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.” 102 Justice Ginsburg reiterated that the analysis must be
of “all of the facts alleged, taken collectively” to determine if there is a
strong inference of scienter. 103 Third, in making that determination of
whether “the pleaded facts give rise to a ‘strong’ inference of scienter,
the court must take into account plausible opposing inferences.”104
Justice Ginsburg further articulated this three-part analysis by stating
that “the strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum.” 105
Instead, a court must consider “nonculpable explanations for the defend97. Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 593 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 194 (1976)).
98. Id. at 594; see also Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506.
99. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506 (citing Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 595-600).
100. Id. at 2509.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2510.
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ant’s conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.” 106 Some may
argue that the majority was attempting to swing the pendulum back
toward the plaintiffs; Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the inference set
forth by the plaintiffs need not be of the “smoking gun” nature or even
“the most plausible of competing interests.” 107 Rather, the Court held
that a complaint would be defeated by a motion to dismiss unless “a
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the
facts alleged.” 108
In a nutshell, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to accept
the allegations set forth in the complaint as true, and then determine if a
reasonable person would find that the inference of scienter is at least as
strong as any competing interest. Thus, “if the answer to this analysis is
no, then the inference is not ‘strong’ under the PSLRA.” 109
In reality, the decision in Tellabs “strengthens the pleading standard
set forth by Congress in the PSLRA, and creates a uniformly high bar
for pleading scienter in securities fraud cases.” 110 As a result, the Tellabs
case further supports the existing hurdles erected to make it difficult for
plaintiffs who hope to sustain a securities fraud claim.
Thus, after Tellabs, practitioners and scholars must acknowledge
that perhaps forcing top executives to certify regulatory filings pursuant
to SOX is not quite the solution to the corporate financial scandal problem that Congress or investors had hoped for. The certification requirement may still be a powerful incentive for corporate executives to do the
right thing, but its power is diminished by the additional requirement
that a plaintiff must still establish a strong inference of scienter at the
pleading stage. Thus, the certification requirement alone is not the sharp
veil piercing tool it was originally thought to be. The requirement that
an officer sign a certification form will likely work to deter some, but
not others. In fact, many lawyers have been advising executives not to

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
JONATHAN C. DICKEY, PRACTISING LAW INST., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2007: CURRENT TRENDS IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LITIGATION
28 (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
Dickey-SecuritiesLitigationAndEnforcementInstitute2007.pdf.
110. Id. at 30.
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focus too much on the certification requirement, “telling them that it’s
not a new and unique liability that’s been imposed.” 111
As for the concern over the apparent increase in exposure to claims
faced by auditing firms, there seems to be less of a cause for alarm than
originally feared. With the exception of Arthur Andersen, the number of
class actions against auditing firms has actually decreased in the past
two years. 112 Simultaneously, those claims that have been initiated have
largely been dismissed due to the heightened pleading standards established under the PSLRA. 113 It appears that there is no greater risk faced
by auditors than that faced by corporate executives.
IV. A LOOK AT THE RECENT TREND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS/DIRECTORS,
AND AUDITING FIRMS
“For the first time since [Sarbanes-Oxley] was enacted in 2001,
there seems to be mounting concern that the pendulum has swung too far
towards ‘over regulation’ in the wake of the collapse of Enron,
Worldcom, Adelphia, and other companies . . . .” 114 Despite the difficulties faced by litigants who attempt to pierce the corporate veil with
the dull sword provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, some industry groups are
taking a look at the current legislation and are drafting proposals to
provide corporations and accounting firms with a new shield against
both criminal penalties and civil lawsuits. As noted in one article in the
New York Times, “two influential industry groups . . . are hoping to
swing the regulatory pendulum in the opposite direction.” 115 The aim of
these groups appears to be threefold: (1) to limit the liability of
accounting firms; (2) to reduce the number of lawsuits brought by
shareholders; and, (3) to narrow the focus of prosecutors toward the

111.
112.

See Glater, supra note 14, at 5.
Gideon, Accounting Fraud, supra note 60, at 1104 (noting that class action
filings in 2006 declined 38% from 2005 and were 43% lower than the 10-year average).
113. See Ezra Charitable Trust v. Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 466 F.3d 1, 33 (1st Cir. 2006)
(dismissing the claims against PricewaterhouseCoopers and holding that the accounting
restatements were not enough to establish scienter under the PSLRA pleading
requirements).
114. DICKEY, supra note 109, at 2.
115. Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 2006, at 1.
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individual violators instead of prosecuting whole companies. 116 In
addition, these groups aim to reduce the burdens imposed by SarbanesOxley and to provide the SEC with broader discretion on the interpretation and enforcement fronts. Support has grown for these proposals –
particularly after the Supreme Court overturned the obstruction of
justice conviction of Arthur Andersen in connection with its shredding
of Enron-related documents. 117
The vindication of Arthur Andersen came too late to save the firm
from collapse, but it did prompt commentators to acknowledge that
preemptively limiting the exposure for auditing firms, and corporations
in general, would make the likelihood of a future major accounting firm
collapse significantly less likely. Some of the reforms that are being
considered which are specifically aimed at protecting accounting include: (1) creating safe harbors for certain defined auditing practices, 118
(2) setting a cap on auditor liability in certain circumstances, and clarifying and limiting auditor’s duties under Section 10A, 119 (3) restricting
criminal penalties against firms as opposed to individual auditing partners, 120 and (4) granting regulators specific powers to appoint monitors
to oversee operations of audit firms found to have engaged in systematic
failures in process, management, or personnel. 121
As noted by Conrad Hewitt, Chief Accountant for the SEC,
accounting firms are the final target in many of these lawsuits because
the company at issue no longer has the resources to satisfy a judgment. 122 Hewitt also noted that:

116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2007, at C1 (discussing the SEC’s plans to protect corporations, executives, and
accounting firms from investor lawsuits).
119. Id.; Conrad Hewitt, Chief Accountant, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks
to the Practising Law Institute’s SEC Speaks Series (Feb. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov./news/speech/2007/spch020907cwh.htm.
120. Labaton, supra note 115.
121. Jonathan C. Dickey, Auditor Liability “Caps” – The Politics of Catastrophe, 5
SEC. LITIG. REP. 5 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/Dickey-AuditorLiabilityCaps.pdf (citing the Paulson Committee Report).
122. See Hewitt, supra note 119 (stating that large accounting firms are often the
“deep pocket” litigants pursue to recover losses).
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the issue does not appear to be the number of meritless lawsuits that
are filed, but the fact that potential claims against major accounting
firms can be so large that a judgment in any one case might force a
firm into bankruptcy and result in further consolidation of the audit
123
profession with fewer firms.

He concluded by suggesting that the accounting profession propose
to Congress that reasonable limits be placed on auditing firms’ exposure
to liability for violations of federal securities regulations, in much the
same way liability has been limited for other professions in the U.S. and
in Europe 124 .
Commentators have also proposed changes that would direct
prosecutors to seek redress from the individuals actually responsible for
the securities violations rather than corporations as a whole. 125 While on
first blush this may seem appealing, a persuasive opposing argument
exists; in large corporations it is often very difficult for prosecutors and
shareholders to ferret out evidence that pinpoints the specific persons
involved with the fraudulent activities.
Responding to these arguments, SOX proponents counter that the
proposed reforms are misguided responses to a false alarm. According
to some studies, SOX has not had the effect of significantly increasingly
the number of securities claims. 126 Such results suggest that there does
not appear to be a need to loosen regulation. Moreover, opponents of
the groups seeking SOX revisions believe certain suggested revisions
would “dramatically diminish the effectiveness of the S.E.C., of criminal
enforcement, of state attorney general enforcement, and of private
damage actions . . . .” 127
However, in the author’s view, some of the groups’ proposals to
amend SOX do have merit. Proposals seeking to direct certain disputes
to arbitration, or to judges rather than juries, and limiting the liability of
accounting firms to prevent further shrinkage in the industry have some
validity and warrant further investigation.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.; see infra Section V.
Labaton, supra note 115.
Roger Russell, Facing the Storm: Planning and SOX Worrying Insurers,
ACCOUNTING TODAY, July 26, 2004 – Aug. 8, 2004 (quoting Ken Mackunis, president
of Aon Insurance Services, the administrator for the American Institute of CPAs
Professional Liability Insurance Program).
127. See Floyd Norris & Stephen Labaton, Panel Urging Rewriting Rules to Aid
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at 2.
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V. HOW HAS EUROPE HANDLED SECURITIES FRAUD ISSUES?
In light of the challenges facing lawmakers, corporate officers, and
accounting firms in the United States, it is relevant to consider how
these issues are being dealt with abroad. In Europe, the debate has been
focused on the accounting industry and the risks posed to it by excessive
and burdensome litigation. Indeed, experts in the United States concur
and have expressed concern over the severity of this issue. In particular,
the collapse of Arthur Andersen has provoked major worldwide concern
over the status of the accounting industry. A recent spate of studies and
reports express concern over the fragile state of the Industry and of the
remaining “Big Four” firms that dominate it. 128 The number of barriers
to entry facing mid-sized auditing firms diminishes the likelihood that
new competition will challenge these four major firms. 129 Meanwhile,
even the “Big Four” are finding it difficult to endure while laboring under the constant risk of potentially fatal litigation. 130 One study reports
that “[t]he profession is already viewed as increasingly less attractive
and risky . . . .” and that “[a] major claim that threatens the survival of a
firm would simply reinforce the negative perceptions about the
profession.” 131 Further, experts predict that the collapse of one or more
of the “Big Four” firms could have catastrophic consequences for capital
markets. 132
In response to this problem, countries in the European Union have
begun debating the merits of widespread caps on auditor liability. Under
a liability cap, the possible recovery against auditing firms would be
limited either to a fixed amount, or by a formula that takes into account

128. DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL MKT. & SERVS., CONSULTATION ON
AUDITORS’ LIABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS
(COMMISION STAFF WORKING PAPER, Jan. 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/inter
nal_market/auditing/docs/liability/consultation-paper_en.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION
PAPER].
129. Id. at 8-9.
130. Id. at 9.
131. See LONDON ECONOMICS, STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AUDITORS’
LIABILITY REGIMES 209-10 (Sept. 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/auditing/docs/liability/auditors-final-report_en.pdf [hereinafter LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY].
132. AccountingWEB.co.uk, EU Audit Liability Cap Looks Likely, http://www.
accountingweb.co.uk/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=169456&d=1025&h=1024&f=1026 (last visited Jan. 18, 2009).
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certain factors. 133 Proponents put forth several different policies that
would be advanced by capping liability. Major policy rationales include:
protecting capital markets from the potentially devastating collapse of a
major auditing firm, 134 lowering the barriers to entry for competition by
middle-tier firms, 135 and making the size of future claims more predictable so as to improve the insurability of audit activity. 136 Additionally,
such caps may help prevent the “deepest pockets” syndrome described
by Hewitt. 137 This occurs when plaintiffs, seeking a large recovery, shift
liability onto the auditing firm even when it may be responsible for only
a small portion of the wrongdoing. 138 Of course, liability caps are not
without their critics, who claim that such caps may reduce the quality of
audits. 139
A recent European Commission Working Paper contained several
methods of remedying the problem of over-litigation, listing as the most
straightforward method the imposition of an absolute cap on auditor
liability. 140 This approach has already been employed in some countries,
and is relatively simple: it imposes a fixed monetary cap on the recovery
that may be sought by an injured plaintiff against an auditing firm. 141
This “one size fits all” approach is inflexible, however, and it would be
difficult to calculate the exact level at which to cap liability. 142 A
modified version of this approach could help alleviate some of these
drawbacks by offering a variable cap on liability. For example, the cap
could be set according to the size of the company being audited 143 or by
the fees that the auditing firm charges the company. 144
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 185.
Id.
Id.
COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 128, at 7; see Hewitt, supra note 119.
LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 186; COMMISSION PAPER,
supra note 128, at 7.
139. Penny Sukhraj, Big Four Gains Support on Liability Argument, ACCOUNTANCY
AGE, Oct. 12, 2006.
140. COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 128, at 12.
141. Id.
142. Id. (“If such a cap were set too high, mid-tier audit firms would be further
disadvantaged. If, on the other hand, the cap were set too low, this might have a
negative impact on the quality for the audit of major listed companies.”).
143. Id. at 12-13 (noting that this offers the advantage of alleviating the burden on
mid-sized accounting firms, thus promoting competition).
144. Id. at 13.
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Finally, an alternative approach would be to implement a policy of
proportionate liability, limiting the auditor’s damages to those caused by
their own mistakes and not the mistakes of their clients. 145 This would
run counter to the usual system of joint and several liability, whereby
auditing firms may “bear a portion of the charges resulting from the
misconduct of the audited company, in particular if that company goes
bankrupt.” 146 Instead, under the proportional liability method, courts
could allocate damages according to the portion of fault attributed to the
auditing company, or allow auditing firms and their clients to work out
contractual agreements specifying the proportion of liability. 147 On the
downside, this method of apportioning damage may seem less transparent to the public than simply setting a clearly defined cap on liability. 148 Nonetheless, out of all these methods, the proportionate liability
option has gained support even amongst skeptics of liability capping.149
Furthermore, it is possible to imagine a combination of these approaches, such as layering a variable cap on top of a proportionate liability
system. Although the U.S. has adopted a system of proportionate liability, auditors are still offered less protection than in the European Union,
due to the United States’ allowance of punitive damages. 150
Currently, five European countries impose a liability cap on auditing firms: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, and Slovenia. 151 Though
the amount and nature of the caps vary among each country, they all
impose a limit on the liability of auditing firms. 152 In an effort to exam145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12 (“A variable cap would be more transparent . . . as compared with
proportionate liability.”).
149. Letter from Ondrej Petr, Regulatory Policy – Primary Mkts., Int’l Capital Mkt.
Ass’n, to Jim Bellingham, Corporate Law & Governance Directorate, Dep’t of Trade &
Indus. 2 (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.icma-group.org/getdoc/51ac14c201c2-401d-9f00-6c2e22fcdd2b/ICMA-Response-to-DTI-CP-re-Statutory-AuditDirecti.aspx (“[W]e find proportionate liability (rather than fixed liability caps) the least
problematic solution . . . .”).
150. COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 128, at 7-8.
151. LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 153.
152. Slovenia sets the liability at a steady €150,000; Greece sets the liability at “Five
times the total of the annual emoluments of the President of the Supreme Court or the
total of the fees of the liable Certified Auditor in the previous financial year provided
that the latter exceeded the former limit”; Austria sets the limit based on the size of
auditing firm; Belgium and Germany set the liability according to whether the auditing
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ine how empirically successful these liability caps are in advancing the
aforementioned policies, the London School of Economics conducted a
study which compared the results of countries with liability caps to those
without such caps. 153 The study analyzed several different criteria and
came up with many relevant conclusions:
•
•
•

•

In some circumstances, the cost of unlimited liability may outweigh the benefits. 154
Audit quality is not adversely affected by the presence of
liability caps. 155
According to auditing firms polled, firms in countries with unlimited liability schemes find it harder to recruit and retain
qualified talent. 156 These firms also feel that unlimited liability
reduces their ability to supply the audit market. 157
Liability caps may help increase competition by the lowering the
barriers to competition facing middle-tier firms. 158

Finally, two additional points are worthy of mention. First, the
study found that, according to the data available, comparisons of
countries with liability caps and those without liability caps showed no
significant difference in the average dollar amount of recovery on
claims. 159 The reason is that, in countries that cap liability, the cap only
applies to negligent conduct. 160 That is, that cap may be disregarded
where the auditor’s conduct is found to be intentional or grossly
negligent. This has resulted in many plaintiffs alleging intentional
wrongdoing or fraud, in an attempt to get a higher recovery or settlefirm is listed or unlisted. See LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 187-88.
153. LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 164-65.
154. Id. at 177 (“[U]nlimited liability may in certain cases imply that the costs of
unlimited liability exceed the benefits from a welfare point of view.”).
155. Id. at 158 (“[W]e conclude that audit quality, as proxied by accruals
management, does not appear to be significantly affected by the existence of a cap.”).
156. Id. at 176.
157. Id. at 180 (“Overall, the unlimited liability regime is perceived as having a
potentially significant impact on the capacity of firms to supply the audit market.”).
158. Id. at 164 (“This suggests that the existence of an auditor liability cap may help
middle-tier firms break into the market segment that is largely dominated by the Big-4
firms in many countries. The very small size of the sample with an auditor liability cap,
however, does not allow one to draw strong inferences from the data.”).
159. Id. at 159.
160. Id.
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ment. 161 Thus, liability caps can still be circumvented to some extent,
depending on the plaintiff’s pleading. Second, the study also states that
“parties seeking compensation for a loss . . . are likely to seek greater
compensation from directors and officers when the auditor’s liability is
limited.” 162 These points show that even where auditor liability is
capped in some way, the larger issues of pleading requirements and veil
piercing still must be addressed.
CONCLUSION
While post-Enron legislation and regulation, namely SarbanesOxley, was intended to change the complexion of professional liability
for corporate officers and accountants alike, in reality, there hasn’t been
a major shift in claim activity. 163 In fact, rather than rectify the crisis of
confidence in U.S. corporate governance and financial reporting,
Sarbanes-Oxley has actually created a number of gray areas in its interpretation which has led to legal experts, auditors, and corporate executives searching for some solid guidance and alternative solutions.164
Moreover, it appears that even when a corporate officer submits a fraudulent certification to the SEC, the false certification alone will not be
sufficient to establish scienter and to pierce the corporate veil. Now that
the Supreme Court has resolved the split in the Circuit Courts of Appeal
on the issue of what is a “strong inference of scienter” in Tellabs, it is
time to resolve the issue currently making its way through the federal
District Courts – the issue of whether signing a false Section 302
certification provision is enough to establish scienter and to survive the
pleading stage. While some industry groups seek to “swing the pendulum back” to less federal oversight and more self-regulation, the ability
of individual investors to hold a CEO’s and CFO’s feet to the fire for his
false financial certifications seems to not be the panacea initially foreseen by members of the legislature and investors. Despite the codification of personal liability provisions such as Sections 302 and 906 of
SOX, it appears that litigants must still leap the high hurdle of demonstrating a strong inference of scienter – the same requirement established
long before SOX – in order to pierce the corporate veil and hold those
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 196.
See Russell, supra note 126.
Ghoshray, supra note 57, at 488.
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officers who committed fraud responsible for the devastation their
actions have caused.
First, Congress must revisit the language it used in Sections 302
and 906 and amend the statute to specifically provide that a CEO’s or
CFO’s signature on a fraudulent certification does establish a strong inference of scienter. Leaving this evaluation to the courts on a case-bycase basis will only expand the myriad of interpretations employed by
the federal district courts and will exacerbate the inconsistency that already exists on the issue. As discussed above, despite the fact that the
Supreme Court has provided the framework for defining a “strong
inference” of scienter in the Tellabs case, the federal district courts are
still “all over the map” on the issue of whether fraudulent certifications
alone establish that inference. The certification provisions were included for the express purpose of exposing CEOs and CFOs to personal
liability, based on the fact that these officers are supposed to be certifying that the information contained in the financial statements to the SEC
is accurate and true. 165 Therefore, in the view of the author, when the
certified documents contain fraudulent information, the certification
should absolutely be interpreted as providing a strong inference of
scienter.
Next, Congress should consider employing a hybrid of the
European methods for handling auditor liability by creating a variable
cap that slides up or down based on the auditing company’s size and/or
fees, while simultaneously providing a ceiling above which no litigant
can recover against the auditing company. These caps should be specifically applied to situations of negligence; all caps should be removed
for instances of intentional wrongdoing or grossly negligent conduct on
the part of the auditors. This would hopefully provide some security for
the continued viability of the “Big Four” and will also remove some of
the barriers to future growth in the industry.
By implementing the above two suggestions, Congress will loosen
the restraints for litigants to get to the executives who are essentially the
“head” of the securities fraud monster, while simultaneously limiting the
exposure of auditing firms. These proposals listed above would thereby
accomplish two goals: (1) to re-sharpen the blade on the SOX sword,
enabling litigants to pierce the corporate veil and to reach those exec165. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002) (subjecting officers
who intentionally make false Section 906 certifications to up to $5 million in fines and
twenty years in prison).
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utives who are directly responsible for the fraudulent schemes that have
devastated the financial markets in recent years; and, (2) to place some
limitations on the liability of the accounting firms, with the hope that the
capped liability will still remain a sufficient incentive to operate up to
ethical and regulatory standards, while providing the framework to inject
some stability into the industry.

